Abstract. Using a unique Norwegian dataset, which combines information on companies' bank accounts, annual accounts, bankruptcies, and bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As), we find that such M&As increase interest rate margins for nontransparent small and medium sized firms. There is little effect for more transparent companies. Since, due to information asymmetries, nontransparent firms are typically more dependent on bank lending relationships, our results indicate that these relationships are advantageous for such borrowers, and, conversely, the results are not consistent with the presence of a detrimental lock-in effect due to an information monopoly by the relationship lender.
Introduction
Salvaging the value of banks' relationships with their customers has been put forward as one of the main reasons for bailing out banks during banking crises. Seminal work by Bernanke (1983) claimed that the destruction of such relationships contributed to the depth of the Great Depression in the US during the 1930s. This has spurred a large literature on relationship banking. One strand of this literature focuses on the information asymmetries between existing lenders and outside banks, which stems from banks possessing private information about their current debtors. This information asymmetry creates switching costs which limit businesses' ability to switch lenders and thus realize benefits from competition between banks (Sharpe (1990) , Rajan (1992 ), von Thadden (2004 ). Another theory is presented by Boot and Thakor (2000) , where economic value is created through the lending relationship, implying that the relationship is potentially beneficial for both bank lenders and firm borrowers.
Previous research in this area has often focused on large companies due to data availability, particularly in the US. However, small and medium sized companies are usually less complex and more dependent on bank lending relationships. Given the combined size of these companies in the overall economy, understanding these relationships is therefore important.
We provide empirical evidence on the relative importance of these two contrasting theories. We use bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as events that are exogenous and potentially detrimental to existing firm-bank relationship. The predicted impact of a bank M&A on the borrowers varies between the two models. A bank M&A should have a positive effect on borrowers' credit terms if the event breaks up a bank lender's information monopoly, while the effect is potentially negative if the M&A event leads to the loss of the borrowers' share of the value added by the relationship.
To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to use this approach to investigate these different theories of relationship banking. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops a simple theoretical framework. Section 3 has a literature review. Section 4 presents the data.
We show the analysis in Section 5, with robustness checks in Section 6.
Finally, Section 7 gives some concluding remarks.
2. Theoretical framework 2.1. Theory. There is no universally accepted definition of relationship banking in the literature. Boot (2000) defines relationship banking as:
The provision of financial services by a financial intermediary that:
i. invests in obtaining customer-specific information, often proprietary in nature; and ii. evaluates the profitability of these investments through multiple interactions with the same customer over time and/or across products.
This definition is not specific on how to identify a lending relationship empirically. Relationship lending occurs when banks acquire proprietary information about its borrowers throughout the duration of the relationship.
The alternative lending technology is transactional bank lending, where the bank is simply a passive intermediary in channelling funds from savers to borrowers, without any proprietary information. Without detailed data on the type of interactions and production of information which occur between the banks and the borrowing firms, it is impossible to directly distinguish between these two types of lending technologies.
We believe that bank mergers and acquisitions can be used as a "natural experiment" to shed some light on the existence of bank-firm lending relationships, and in particular what effects these relationships have on small and medium sized companies' access to credit. Such M&A events often occur for reasons unrelated to the individual lending relationship between a bank and a specific borrowing firm. But since M&As usually cause substantial reorganizations of the involved banks, and may temporarily or permanently affect the banks' lending operations, it is plausible that such events may have implications for firms' borrowing relationships with the affected banks.
For example, Stein (2002) develops a model where consolidation into larger and more hierarchical banks affects their abilities to advance loans based on "soft" (i.e. proprietary) information.
Note that we primarily focus on the effects of M&A events on the individual firm's bank financing. There may exist other effects, such as increased market power if two banks with significant market positions merge. For our purpose, it is important to distinguish between these two effects on companies' access to credit, and to this end we control for regional lending market concentration.
We can think of two distinct effects of bank M&As, with opposing implications on a firm's credit availability. On the one hand, if an existing relationship has lead to a "lock-in" effect on the customer, its destruction will have benefits for the borrowing firms, since the "lemon" problem when approaching an external, less informed, bank is reduced. Following a bank merger, other banks may face a more attractive pool of loan applicants, and therefore compete more fiercely for the merging banks' customers. On the other hand, the adverse changes to the relationship may reduce synergies enjoyed by both the lender and the borrower, leading to worse credit terms ex post.
The main focus of the paper is on the effects of bank M&As on bank financing measured at the firm-level. We also include an analysis of the effects on individual bank-firm relationships and the results are consistent with the main findings.
In the following section, we present a simple model to illustrate these two different stories more clearly.
2.2. The Model. We consider a model that incorporates the ideas of both Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) , and of Boot and Thakor (2000) . The model bears some similarities to Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004) .
The economy consists of banks (lenders) and firms (borrowers). The banks compete to lend to the firms. There are three dates in the model. Each firm has access to one project that requires external financing of 1 at date 0. There is a continuum of project types, denoted p ∈ [0, 1], where p is a project's probability of success. If successful, a project pays off R at date 2, otherwise, the payoff is zero. The cost of funds for all banks is normalized to one. We assume thatpR ≥ 1, wherep is the mean value of p in the population.
Both the banks and the firms are risk neutral, and we assume that firms have no initial wealth. The firm's project type p is private information for the firm at date 0. Firms cannot credibly signal their type to the banks at this stage. The firm applies for a loan at date 0, to be repaid at date 1.
The borrower requires renewed funding from date 1 to date 2, and therefore needs to apply for a loan at date 1 to repay her initial loan. The new loan is repaid if the project is successfully realized at date 2.
At date 1, the bank which became a lender to a firm at date 0 (the relationship bank) receives a signal about the borrower's type. For simplicity, we assume that this is a perfect signal, i.e., the bank gets to know the borrower's type with certainty. External banks, currently not lending to a given firm, receives the same signal with probability q. We assume that either all or none of the external banks receive this signal. There is thus competition at date 1 between external banks if a signal is received. External banks therefore offer the following break-even interest rate at date 1 If no signal is received, we assume external banks will not offer any loan due to the "lemons" problem. (Simply assume that p min R ≤ 1, which is fulfilled if p min = 0.) Boot and Thakor (2000) develops a model based on the idea that a relationship improves the bank's ability to grant credit. For example, when giving the firm a loan at date 0, a bank performs certain actions which facilitate repeated interactions with the firm. One way to model this is by assuming that the probability of project success is increased once the firm is in a bank relationship. At date 1 the bank is able to make an investment into its existing customer relationship (perhaps at some cost c), such that the revised success probability of the firm's project is
for some θ ≥ 0. This revised probability is conditional on the relationship continuing. Hence, changing bank at date 1 would lead to the loss of the relationship specific increase (θ) in the project's success probability.
The relationship lender must decide between offering a high interest rate, and thus capture only the borrowers which do not receive an offer from external banks, or offer a low interest rate and capture all borrowers. The expected profit from offering a low interest rate, r low = 1 p , is:
The expected profit from offering a high interest rate, r high = R (where relationship bank captures all project NPV), is:
The relationship lender will offer a low interest rate if Π(r low ) ≥ Π(r high ).
This gives:
Define the function q * (θ) as the value of q for which this inequality binds:
This function is monotonously decreasing in θ. Thus, if the value created through the relationship is large, as proxied by a large value of θ, the relationship lender is more likely to offer a low interest rate to its existing borrowers. In this case, we do not experience a lock-in effect from the information monopoly that the relationship lender has.
If we assume competition at date 0, the banks are willing to reduce interest rates in the first period in order to win customers and secure rents in the second period. However, we will not focus on the timing effects here, since we limit our analysis to firms which already are bank borrowers.
However, if the relationship bank were to merge with another bank, the merging process could lead to the loss of the information obtained from the signal about individual customers. If so, the merging bank will compete for the renewed loans at time 1 on equal terms with external banks. If a signal is received, the interest rate offered will be:
If no signal is received about a firm, the banks will offer an interest rate based on the population average (a 'pooling' outcome):
We can think of the probability of external banks getting informed, q, as a measure of the asymmetric information for a given group of borrowers. Typically, borrower accounting information is available. For companies where noncurrent, tangible assets (long-term financial investments and physical assets, e.g., property, machinery etc.) constitute a large fraction of total assets, we expect information asymmetries to be smaller. These assets may be used as collateral for bank loans, and they are arguably more difficult for management to divert for personal benefits. Additionally, the liquidation or resale value of current assets like accounts receivables and inventories is usually more uncertain than that of, e.g., real estate. Therefore, we expect q, the probability of a signal to external banks, to be lower for firms with a large fraction of current or intangible assets on the balance sheet. We call these firms 'opaque' for our purposes. Since a low q value increases the occurrence of a high interest rate charged by the relationship lender, opaque firms should suffer the most from the information monopoly lock-in effect. Bank loans represent the largest source of debt-financing for companies and is particularly important in the capital structure of small and medium sized private companies. There is a large literature on firms' capital structure, and their optimal choices between debt and equity. Traditional theories focus on firms' trade-off between the tax-advantages and distress costs from debt-financing. The main alternative theory has been more concerned with explaining capital structure by informational asymmetries between the company and its outside financiers (pecking order theory). Borrowing from financial intermediaries such as banks is one potential way to alleviate information costs. For example, Diamond (1984) suggests that there are economies of scale in screening and monitoring borrowers, hence motivating the banks' role as delegated monitors and lenders in the financial markets.
Corporate bank financing is traditionally split into two categories:
• Relationship banking: Banks invest in acquiring private information about the borrower both initially and over time, and
• Transactional lending: (see, e.g., Boot (2000) and Berger and Udell (2006) ) Banks rely on verified, 'hard' data and obtain no particular informational advantage compared to other competing banks. Freixas and Rochet (2008 (2nd ed.) ) refer to relationship banking as "the investment in providing financial services that will allow dealing repeatedly with the same customer in a more efficient way."
A bank that enters into a close relationship with the customer must then optimally invest in acquiring credit relevant information. Extensive theoretical and empirical research aims to understand how banks relate to corporate borrowers. Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) initialized the relationship banking literature by showing how monitoring by banks could lead to ex-post information monopolies for the incumbent lenders in a multiperiod setting. The borrowing firms face the risk of a hold-up situation since uninformed potential lenders are impeded from competing since they face a winner's curse. Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that a hold-up situation could have beneficial consequences if it allows the financing of risky, but socially desirable, projects which would otherwise not have been funded. The relationship bank's commercial rationale is to offer low initial interest rates to capture new borrowers, in order to reap future rents as these customers become locked-in. This possibility exists as long as the borrower will not be able to tap new (typically uninformed) sources of credit in the future. In a separate paper, Petersen and Rajan (1994) showed that relationships increased the availability of financing for small and medium sized US firms.
In its classical form, the investment into private borrower information makes the bank better able to distinguish between various types of companies, whilst alternative models, e.g., Boot and Thakor (2000) assume that the Several recent empirical papers study the effects of mergers, although with different approaches, and using more limited datasets than our analyses. Our advantages compared to previous studies of the impact of bank M&As on lending relationships are twofold. First, we have more comprehensive data. This is particularly relevant compared to the US, where research on small and medium sized companies has mostly been based on survey data.
Second, compared to, e.g., the Italian bank lending market, the Norwegian bank lending market is arguably more representative for most other national markets. In Italy, the number of bank relationships per firm is comparatively high, while most Norwegian firms have a single bank lender. It is dubious whether changes in a single relationship is very important for firms that borrow from several relationship banks. We expect information asymmetries to be larger, and thus relationships to be stronger, for firms with fewer bank relationships, thus making our sample more relevant for this purpose.
Additionally, our main focus is to use M&A events to better understand lending relationships, not to learn about the M&A events per se. 4.2. The Datasets. Our analysis benefits from complete population data from Norway on both public and private companies as well as their bank relationships. We apply three main data-sets covering the all company annual accounts, bank accounts and company bankruptcies in Norway for up to 16 years. We also include detailed data on bank mergers and acquisitions.
The combined data-set provide for a comprehensive description of the relationships between companies and banks as well as the possibility of analyzes without any cross-sectional selection biases. We consider all consolidated banking groups in a given year as one entity for the purpose of the analysis.
Our database of bank accounts is unique in its level of details, that it covers the whole national population of companies, the inclusion of deposits, and the identification of all contracting parties in a way which allows both for consolidating the providers (lenders) and for combining the data with complementary data-sets. items from the notes to the accounts, and other company related information such as, e.g., 5 digit industry codes and legal form. See Table (4) for an overview of Norwegian companies generally and bank borrowers in particular.
As discussed above, this paper focuses on the banking relationships of private limited liability non-financial companies. Financial institutions have fundamentally different financing structures which have to be studied separately. We have also excluded public sector non-commercial companies. The database is further described in Mjøs (2007) and Mjøs and Øksnes (2009) .
The selection of companies studied in this paper is defined by this methodology and subsequently applied towards the banking database. The strength of this database is that it covers the Norwegian population of companies, the common organizational number allows for applying a total of 174 variables to all banking customers, the accounts have been approved by an auditor, and there are records of company information for up to 16 years. clearly an event we believe only affected the target bank due to the dominance of the acquiring bank. "Foreign bank mergers and acquisitions" was used whenever a foreign bank was involved.
Empirical Analysis

Research Design. Our regression equation is:
(1)
The alternative dependent variables, (Y it ), are:
Explanatory variables are generally lagged one year compared to the dependent variables. We include a vector Z it−1 of firm, bank, and market control variables, which are described in Table (6) . We control for Size, as measured by the log of total assets. Larger companies are usually more transparent than smaller companies, which could affect their access to credit.
Also, if the granting of a loan has some fixed cost element, small loans may become prohibitively expensive. Fixed and tangible assets can potentially be used as collateral, which a company can put forth against a loan. We therefore include Tangibles, which is the share of total assets which consists of noncurrent tangible assets, i.e., physical assets and long-term loans and investments.
High cash flow and large amounts of cash on the balance sheet increase a company's opportunities to finance projects by internal financing. We therefore include Ebitda assets and Cash assets. Alternatively, a large cash balance could indicate that a firm is financially constrained, in the sense that it has to keep a large amount in cash to offset unexpected payment obligations because it does not have access to necessary financing. We generally find that the presence of large cash buffers reduces the amount that a firm borrows, but it also reduces interest rates paid. A company's bankruptcy probability, calculated as described in the appendix, affects its ability to raise external finance. However, we find the somewhat surprising result that firms with a high bankruptcy probability tend to borrow more than firms with a low bankruptcy probability. This could give some important indications about the workings of small firms. The finding suggests that companies that borrow are those companies which have performed poorly in previous years, and are thus in a greater need of renewed financing than firms which have performed better, as predicted by the pecking order theory, will finance their projects with internal capital.
The availability of external credit at a given point in time is potentially affected by whether the firm already borrows from one or multiple banks.
On the one hand, borrowing from several banks imposes deadweight costs through the duplication of for example administrative and monitoring costs.
But, on the other hand, a company is less exposed to the "lock-in" problem stemming from the relationship lender's information monopoly. We include both a dummy variable, Multibank, indicating whether the firm borrows from several banks, and a measure of how concentrated the firm's borrowing is, textitrel hhi utlaan.
Finally, we include various controls for the concentration of the commercial bank loan market of a firm's region and industry, and the market share of the firm's largest lender in the national, industry and regional market, respectively.
All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. The coefficients on the fixed effects and the control variables are not reported. Our analysis includes companies whose average total assets over the sample years in which they exist are greater than NOK 500,000 and less than NOK 100,000,000 8 . Since our control variables include characteristics of the start-of-period firm-bank borrowing relationship, we exclude any observations, with a date t dependent variable, when a company was not a bank borrower at date t − 1.
5.2.
Overall effect of M&A on borrower firms. Table ( We define the largest bank in a merger, measured by total assets at the last year-end before merger, as being the acquiring bank, whilst the smallest bank is considered the target bank. Table ( 9) indicates that borrowers of merger targets are more adversely affected than borrowers at the acquiring bank. The interest rate charged increases by 0.12 percentage points for target customers, while there is little effect on the acquiring bank's customers.
5.3. Regional market power. We study whether bank mergers and acquisitions influence regional market power. If a bank loan market is relatively concentrated, we expect mergers to have a detrimental effect on firms borrowing in this region, since the merger would further reduce competition.
However, if many lenders with non-trivial market shares are present in the region, a single merger would not have large effects, since businesses still have several alternatives for obtaining credit.
We apply a division of Norway into 161 geographical regions, which are defined as local labour market regions. By calculating bank loan market concentration indices for each of these regions, using the traditional HerfindahlHirschman index measure, and multiplying this with the M&A dummy variable, we can study how the effects of M&As differ between regions of various degrees of market competition.
The results are shown in Table ( 10). The results suggest that market concentration is of little importance. An objection to this conclusion is that our test is too coarse, and that we ignore more subtle consequences of potential market monopoly power. Since we use firm fixed effects, we lose all between-firms variation, and this may also explain our lack of results. We therefore find it difficult to make strong conclusions based on this analysis.
Effect on Lending Relationships.
Table (11) shows regressions where the M&A dummies are multiplied by Opaqueness, a measure denoting the extent to which the firm is non-transparent. This measure refers to the parameter q in the model in Section 2.2. We define this measure simply as:
Since opaque firms have less fixed assets to use as collateral, the extent to which they will repay a bank loan is highly dependent on their future cash flows. This increases potential information asymmetries, and we therefore expect opaque firms to be more dependent on bank relationships. Accordingly, companies with a high share of non-current assets can more easily approach competing banks, using their fixed assets as collateral.
We see that reducing non-current tangible assets from 100 percent to 0 percent of total assets increases effect of a Norwegian merger on the interest rate paid by the company by 0.24 percentage points. This compares to the sample average interest rate margin of 4.0 percent. This result is not consistent with an information monopoly hypothesis along the lines of Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) . On the contrary, the results are more compatible with theories predicting Relationship synergies, where the borrowers share some of the benefit from the value created through the lending relationship. This supports the ideas of both Boot and Thakor (2000) and Bernanke (1983) , and suggests that there are potentially economic losses from destroying banking relationships through bank M&As.
5.5. Analysis on the individual Bank Firm Relationship Level. Ta- bles (12) and (13) The results from Table ( 12) suggest that the loan amount within the relationship tends to decrease following a domestic merger. Since we do not find any significant comparable effects in Table ( In Table ( 13), we see that more opaque firms pay relatively higher interest rates to a bank that merges. The effect is around 0.40 percentage points during the first year after the event, which is somewhat larger than the 0.24
percentage points that we find in Table ( 11).
Robustness
We also run standard OLS regressions, and find that generally interest rates increase and loan size decreases after a domestic merger. For opaque firms, interest rates tend to increase more than for more transparent companies. These results are in line with the main analysis.
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Conclusions
This paper documents the effects of bank mergers and acquisitions in the Norwegian market on firms' access to credit. Domestic bank mergers during the sample period tended to reduce loan availability and increase interest rate margins for borrowers. Our findings are consistent with bank relationships being beneficial for the companies. Nontransparent firms, which depend the most on such relationships, suffer more from bank mergers than more transparent firms which can more easily tap alternative sources of bank financing. We argue that a likely reason for this is that mergers are detrimental, by terminating valuable lending relationship. A.2. The Sebra model of bankruptcy probability. Norges Bank, the Central Bank of Norway, applies the Sebra model to analyse risk in the corporate sector and predict company specific bankruptcy probabilities. The model is well documented, see, e.g., Eklund et al. (2001) . The model is a logit model where bankruptcy is a binary variable which takes the value 1 in a firm/year-observation if it is the last year a company files its annual accounts and it also enters a formal bankruptcy process within 3 years. The model is estimated using population accounting data for Norwegian companies and the explanatory variables are earnings/total assets, (liquid assets -short term debt)/turnover, unpaid indirect taxes 10 /total assets, trade credit/total assets, equity/total assets, book equity < paid-in equity (0/1), dividend payments (0/1), industry average equity/total assets, industry average trade credit/total assets, industry standard deviation for earnings/total assets, age dummies (years ≤ 8), and total assets.
We apply the model in a slightly modified form utilizing the accounting database and the bankruptcy database described above instead of the historic estimates of coefficient given in Eklund et al. (2001) . This both allows for more updated predictions and for a systematic, rolling, distinction between in-sample estimations and out-of-sample predictions for each year in the database. 29, 031 30, 711 33, 392 35, 975 35, 762 35, 391 34, 993 37, 661 40, 134 41, 769 44, 804 Financial debt 9, 240 10, 408 11, 432 13, 182 13, 319 13, 968 12, 728 13, 316 14, 412 15, 262 14, 018 
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